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    SubjectRe: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks
    On Mon, 2006-04-17 at 18:44 -0700, Gerrit Huizenga wrote:
    > On Mon, 17 Apr 2006 23:55:25 BST, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
    > > On Mon, Apr 17, 2006 at 03:15:29PM -0700, Gerrit Huizenga wrote:
    > > > configure correctly that most of them disable it. In theory, LSM +
    > > > something like AppArmour provides a much simpler security model for
    > >
    > > apparmor falls into the findamentally broken category above, so it's
    > > totally uninteresting except as marketing candy for the big red company.
    > Is there a pointer to why it is fundamentally broken? I haven't seen
    > such comments before but it may be that I've been hanging out on the
    > wrong lists or spending too much time inhaling air at 30,000 feet.

    See the last para of the Useability discussion from the SELinux summit
    (re a proposal for pathname-based configuration in SELinux, and why it isn't a good idea)

    Stephen Smalley
    National Security Agency

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