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    SubjectRe: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks
    On Tue, 2006-04-18 at 12:31 -0700, Crispin Cowan wrote:
    > Karl MacMillan wrote:
    > > Which is one reason why SELinux has types (equivalence classes) - it
    > > makes it possible to group large numbers of applications or resources
    > > into the same security category. The targeted policy that ships with
    > > RHEL / Fedora shows how this works in practice.
    > >
    > AppArmor (then called "SubDomain") showed how this worked in practice
    > years before the Targeted Policy came along. The Targeted Policy
    > implements an approximation to the AppArmor security model, but does it
    > with domains and types instead of path names, imposing a substantial
    > cost in ease-of-use on the user.

    I would suspect that the "filename" thing will be the biggest achilles
    after all what does filename mean in a linux world with
    * hardlinks
    * chroot
    * namespaces
    * bind mounts
    * unlink of open files
    * fd passing over unix sockets
    * relative pathnames
    * multiple threads (where one can unlink+replace file while the other is
    in the validation code)

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      Last update: 2006-04-18 21:53    [W:5.872 / U:0.152 seconds]
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