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    SubjectRe: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK
    Quoting r. Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>:
    > Subject: Re: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK
    >
    > On Mon, 13 Feb 2006, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
    > >
    > > Like this then?
    >
    > Almost. I would still prefer madvise_vma to allow MADV_DONTFORK
    > on a VM_IO vma, even though it must prohibit MADV_DOFORK there.
    > But if Linus disagrees, of course ignore me.

    I'm not sure about this point. Linus?

    > Comments much better, thanks. I didn't get your point about mlock'd
    > memory, but I'm content to believe you're thinking of an issue that
    > hasn't occurred to me.

    I'm referring to the follwing, from man mlock(2):

    "Cryptographic security software often handles critical bytes like passwords
    or secret keys as data structures. As a result of paging, these secrets could
    be transfered onto a persistent swap store medium, where they might be
    accessible to the enemy long after the security software has erased the
    secrets in RAM and terminated."



    --
    Michael S. Tsirkin
    Staff Engineer, Mellanox Technologies
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