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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps
    Page http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html updated ...
    Kernel 2.6.18.2 updated ...
    System keeps on humming ...
    Is anyone else using/testing the patch? Please give feedback ...
    Thanks ...

    Chris


    On Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:10:21 -0600
    "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:

    > Sorry, I should have noticed and fixed this much sooner. This
    > patch is against the latest full fscaps patch which I'm replying
    > to.
    >
    > From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
    > Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:01:49 -0600
    > Subject: security: file caps: fix unused variable warnings
    >
    > Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
    > when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
    > up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
    > function.
    >
    > Rename vfs_cap_data_struct to remove redundant '_struct'.
    >
    > Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
    > ---
    > security/commoncap.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
    > 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
    >
    > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
    > index 6f5e46c..4b50b4d 100644
    > --- a/security/commoncap.c
    > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
    > @@ -109,16 +109,17 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct
    > target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
    > }
    >
    > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
    > #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
    > #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
    > -struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
    > +struct vfs_cap_data {
    > __u32 version;
    > __u32 effective;
    > __u32 permitted;
    > __u32 inheritable;
    > };
    >
    > -static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
    > +static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
    > {
    > cap->version = le32_to_cpu(cap->version);
    > cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(cap->effective);
    > @@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static inline void convert_to_le(struct
    > cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(cap->inheritable);
    > }
    >
    > -static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
    > +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
    > {
    > int i;
    >
    > @@ -149,39 +150,14 @@ static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_c
    > return 0;
    > }
    >
    > -int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    > +/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
    > +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    > {
    > struct dentry *dentry;
    > ssize_t rc;
    > - struct vfs_cap_data_struct cap_struct;
    > + struct vfs_cap_data cap_struct;
    > struct inode *inode;
    >
    > - /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
    > -
    > - cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
    > - cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
    > - cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
    > -
    > - /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
    > - * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
    > - * capability sets for the file.
    > - *
    > - * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
    > - * and permitted sets of the executable file.
    > - */
    > -
    > - if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
    > - if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
    > - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
    > - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
    > - }
    > - if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
    > - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
    > - }
    > -
    > -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
    > - /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
    > -
    > dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
    > inode = dentry->d_inode;
    > if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) {
    > @@ -216,9 +192,42 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
    > bprm->cap_permitted = cap_struct.permitted;
    > bprm->cap_inheritable = cap_struct.inheritable;
    >
    > -#endif
    > return 0;
    > }
    > +#else
    > +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    > +{
    > + return 0;
    > +}
    > +#endif
    > +
    > +int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    > +{
    > + /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
    > +
    > + cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
    > + cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
    > + cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
    > +
    > + /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
    > + * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
    > + * capability sets for the file.
    > + *
    > + * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
    > + * and permitted sets of the executable file.
    > + */
    > +
    > + if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
    > + if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
    > + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
    > + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
    > + }
    > + if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
    > + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
    > + }
    > +
    > + return set_file_caps(bprm);
    > +}
    >
    > void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
    > {
    > --
    > 1.4.1
    >


    --------------------
    Chris Friedhoff
    chris@friedhoff.org
    -
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