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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps
    Sorry, I should have noticed and fixed this much sooner.  This
    patch is against the latest full fscaps patch which I'm replying
    to.

    From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
    Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:01:49 -0600
    Subject: security: file caps: fix unused variable warnings

    Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
    when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
    up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
    function.

    Rename vfs_cap_data_struct to remove redundant '_struct'.

    Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
    ---
    security/commoncap.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
    1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

    diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
    index 6f5e46c..4b50b4d 100644
    --- a/security/commoncap.c
    +++ b/security/commoncap.c
    @@ -109,16 +109,17 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct
    target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
    }

    +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
    #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
    #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
    -struct vfs_cap_data_struct {
    +struct vfs_cap_data {
    __u32 version;
    __u32 effective;
    __u32 permitted;
    __u32 inheritable;
    };

    -static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
    +static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
    {
    cap->version = le32_to_cpu(cap->version);
    cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(cap->effective);
    @@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static inline void convert_to_le(struct
    cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(cap->inheritable);
    }

    -static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap)
    +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
    {
    int i;

    @@ -149,39 +150,14 @@ static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_c
    return 0;
    }

    -int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    +/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
    +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    {
    struct dentry *dentry;
    ssize_t rc;
    - struct vfs_cap_data_struct cap_struct;
    + struct vfs_cap_data cap_struct;
    struct inode *inode;

    - /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
    -
    - cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
    - cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
    - cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
    -
    - /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
    - * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
    - * capability sets for the file.
    - *
    - * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
    - * and permitted sets of the executable file.
    - */
    -
    - if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
    - if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
    - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
    - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
    - }
    - if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
    - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
    - }
    -
    -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
    - /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
    -
    dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
    inode = dentry->d_inode;
    if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) {
    @@ -216,9 +192,42 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES
    bprm->cap_permitted = cap_struct.permitted;
    bprm->cap_inheritable = cap_struct.inheritable;

    -#endif
    return 0;
    }
    +#else
    +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    +{
    + return 0;
    +}
    +#endif
    +
    +int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
    +{
    + /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
    +
    + cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
    + cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
    + cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);
    +
    + /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
    + * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
    + * capability sets for the file.
    + *
    + * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
    + * and permitted sets of the executable file.
    + */
    +
    + if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
    + if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
    + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
    + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
    + }
    + if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
    + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
    + }
    +
    + return set_file_caps(bprm);
    +}

    void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
    {
    --
    1.4.1
    -
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