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SubjectRe: Registration Weakness in Linux Kernel's Binary formats
Date
On Oct 03, 2006, at 17:25:07, Bráulio Oliveira wrote:
> Just forwarding....

Well, you could have checked the list archives first to make sure the
idiot didn't send it here himself. Secondly if you're going to
forward something like this best send it to security@kernel.org first.

Of course, it's partially the abovementioned idiot's fault for BCCing
a mailing list and several others:
> To: undisclosed-recipients

> Hello,
> The present document aims to demonstrate a design weakness found in
> the
> handling of simply linked lists used to register binary
> formats handled by Linux kernel, and affects all
> the kernel families (2.0/2.2/2.4/2.6), allowing the insertion of
> infection modules in kernel space that can be used by malicious
> users to create infection tools, for example rootkits.

Would be nice if I could get to your paper to actually read it, but
as it returns a 404 error I'm going to make one brief statement:

If you can load another binary format or access the "simply linked
lists" of the binfmt chain in any way, then you're root and therefore
there are easier ways to own the box than patching the kernel.

Cheers,
Kyle Moffett



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