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    SubjectRe: RFC [patch 13/34] PID Virtualization Define new task_pid api
    Eric W. Biederman wrote:
    > Hubertus Franke <> writes:

    > ...
    >>Actions: The vpid_to_pid will disappear and the check for whether we are in the
    >>container needs to be pushed down into the task lookup. question remains to
    >>figure out
    >>whether the context of the task lookup (will always remain the caller ?).
    > You don't need a same container check. If something is in another container
    > it becomes invisible to you.

    Eric, agreed.... that was implied by me (but poorly worded). What I meant (lets try this
    again) is that the context defines/provides the namespace in which the lookup
    is performed, hence as you say state.. naturally things in different containers
    (namespaces) are invisible to you..

    >>Doing so has an implication, namely that we are moving over to "system
    >>The current implementation requires the vpid/pid only for the boundary condition
    >>at the
    >>top of the container (to rewrite pid=1) and its parent and the fact that we
    >>a global look through container=0.
    >>If said boundary would be eliminated and we simply make a container a child of
    >>initproc (pid=1), this would be unnecessary.
    >>all together this would provide private namespaces (as just suggested by Eric).
    >>The feeling would be that large parts of patch could be reduce by this.
    > I concur. Except I think the initial impact could still be large.
    > It may be worth breaking all users of pids just so we audit them.
    > But that will certainly result in no long term cost, or runtime overhead.
    >>What we need is a new system calls (similar to vserver) or maybe we can continue
    >>the /proc approach for now...
    >>sys_exec_container(const *char container_name, pid_t pid, unsigned int flags,
    >>const *char argv, const *char envp);
    >>exec_container creates a new container (if indicated in flags) and a new task in
    >>it that reports to parent initproc.
    >>if a non-zero pid is specified we use that pid, otherwise the system will
    >>allocate it. Finally
    >>it create new session id ; chroot and exec's the specified program.
    >>What we loose with this is the session and the tty, which Cedric described as
    >>The sys_exec_container(...) seems to be similar to what Eric just called
    > Similar. But I was actually talking about just adding another flag to
    > sys_clone the syscall underlying fork(). Basically it is just another
    > resource not share or not-share.
    > Eric

    That's a good idea .. right now we simply did this through a flag left by the call
    to the /proc/container fs ... (awkward at best, but didn't break the API).
    I have a concern wrt doing it in during fork namely the sharing of resources.
    Whe obviously are looking at some constraints here wrt to sharing. We need to
    ensure that this ain't a thread etc that will share resources
    across "containers" (which then later aren't migratable due to that sharing).
    So doing the fork_exec() atomically would avoid that problem.

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      Last update: 2006-01-23 19:41    [W:0.027 / U:68.796 seconds]
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