lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2005]   [Aug]   [9]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: capabilities patch (v 0.1)
* Bodo Eggert (7eggert@gmx.de) wrote:
> 1) I wouldn't want an exploited service to gain any privileges, even by
> chaining userspace exploits (e.g. exec sendmail < exploitstring). For
> most services, I'd like CAP_EXEC being unset (but it doesn't exist).

Don't let it exec things it shouldn't. This can be done with namespaces
or for finer-grained, that is what smth like SELinux is made for.

> 2) There are environments (linux-vserver.org) which limit root to a subset
> of capabilities. I think they might use that feature, too. Off cause a
> simple "suid bit" == "all capabilities" scheme won't work there.

IIRC, they effectively use the bounded set as per-context. So it'd not
make any difference there.

thanks,
-chris
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2005-08-10 00:27    [W:0.058 / U:0.860 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site