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SubjectRe: [PATCH 5/5] Remove unnecesary capability hooks in rootplug.
Ok, with the attached patch SELinux seems to work correctly.  You'll
probably want to make it a little prettier :) Note I have NOT ran the
ltp tests for correctness. I'll do some performance runs, though
unfortunately can't do so on ppc right now.

thanks,
-serge

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com
--
hooks.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

Index: linux-2.6.12/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.12.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c 2005-08-25 12:56:51.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.12/security/selinux/hooks.c 2005-08-25 14:27:53.000000000 -0500
@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_st
struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
+ rc = secondary_ops->ptrace ? secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -1372,7 +1372,9 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_st
if (error)
return error;

- return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return secondary_ops->capget ?
+ secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable,
+ permitted) : 0;
}

static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
@@ -1380,7 +1382,9 @@ static int selinux_capset_check(struct t
{
int error;

- error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ error = secondary_ops->capset_check ?
+ secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective,
+ inheritable, permitted) : 0;
if (error)
return error;

@@ -1390,14 +1394,16 @@ static int selinux_capset_check(struct t
static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ if (secondary_ops->capset_set)
+ secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable,
+ permitted);
}

static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
+ rc = secondary_ops->capable ? secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -1412,7 +1418,7 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *tab
u32 tsid;
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
+ rc = secondary_ops->sysctl ? secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -1484,7 +1490,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+ rc = secondary_ops->syslog ? secondary_ops->syslog(type) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -1527,7 +1533,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;

- rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ rc = secondary_ops->capable ?
+ secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) : 0;
if (rc == 0)
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
@@ -1570,7 +1577,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(str
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
+ rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security ?
+ secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -1637,7 +1645,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_security(str

static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+ return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security ?
+ secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm) : 0;
}


@@ -1655,7 +1664,9 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (stru
PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
}

- return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+ return (atsecure ||
+ secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec ?
+ secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm) : 0);
}

static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1756,7 +1767,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(str
u32 sid;
int rc;

- secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+ if (secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds)
+ secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);

tsec = current->security;

@@ -1982,7 +1994,8 @@ static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
+ rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount ?
+ secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -1998,7 +2011,8 @@ static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmoun
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
+ rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount ?
+ secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2032,7 +2046,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_link(struct den
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_link ?
+ secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
@@ -2047,7 +2062,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct i
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink ?
+ secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
@@ -2082,7 +2098,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct in
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod ?
+ secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2115,7 +2132,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(str
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link ?
+ secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
@@ -2126,7 +2144,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(stru
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission ?
+ secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2143,7 +2162,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr ?
+ secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2453,7 +2473,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+ rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap ?
+ secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2470,7 +2491,8 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+ rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect ?
+ secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2610,7 +2632,8 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_create ?
+ secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2662,7 +2685,8 @@ static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0

static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
- return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
+ return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid ?
+ secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags) : 0;
}

static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -2696,7 +2720,8 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct t
{
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice ?
+ secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2708,7 +2733,8 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsign
struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit ?
+ secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2737,7 +2763,8 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task
u32 perm;
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_kill ?
+ secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

@@ -2778,7 +2805,8 @@ static void selinux_task_reparent_to_ini
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;

- secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
+ if (secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init)
+ secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);

tsec = p->security;
tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
@@ -3227,7 +3255,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_co
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int err;

- err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
+ err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect ?
+ secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk) : 0;
if (err)
return err;

@@ -3603,7 +3632,8 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct s
struct av_decision avd;
int err;

- err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+ err = secondary_ops->netlink_send ?
+ secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb) : 0;
if (err)
return err;

@@ -3949,7 +3979,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmi
u32 perms;
int rc;

- rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+ rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat ?
+ secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;

-
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