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> However, a few things: > > - is there anything in the current implementation of the permission stuff > which might tie our hands if it is later reimplemented? IOW: does the > current FUSE user interface in any way lock us into the current FUSE > implementation (fuse_allow_task())? No. This thing is above the userspace interface and completely independent. Either a task is allowed, and then the request goes through to the interface. Or if it's not, the request is stopped right there, and never reaches the userspace interface. > - the fuse mount options don't seem to be documented True. I'll send a patch (they are documented in the README of the fuse distribution). > - aren't we going to remove the nfs semi-server feature? I leave the decision to you ;) It's a separate independent patch already (fuse-nfs-export.patch). > - Frank points out that a user can send a sigstop to his own setuid(0) > task and he intimates that this could cause DoS problems with FUSE. More > details needed please? Will follow up in Franks answer. > - I don't recall seeing an exhaustive investigation of how an > unprivileged user could use a FUSE mount to implement DoS attacks against > other users or against root. Here's a description of a theoretical DoS scenario: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=111522019516694&w=2 Miklos - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||||
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