![]() | |||||||||||
Messages in this thread |
On Fri, May 20, 2005 at 04:41:23PM -0400, Reiner Sailer wrote: > James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> wrote on 05/20/2005 04:32:58 PM: > > On Fri, 20 May 2005, Reiner Sailer wrote: > > > > > > Why are you using LSM for this? > > > > > > > > LSM should be used for comprehensive access control frameworks which > > > > significantly enhance or even replace existing Unix DAC security. > > > > > > I see LSM is framework for security. IMA is an architecture that > > > enforces access control in a different way than SELinux. IMA guarantees > > > that executable content is measured and accounted for before > > > it is loaded and can access (and possibly corrupt) system resources. > > > > LSM is an access control framework. Your (few) LSM hooks always return > > zero, and don't enforce access control at all. You even have a separate > > measurement hook for modules. > > > > I suggest implementing all of your code via distinct measurement hooks, so > > measurement becomes a distinct and well defined security entity within the > > kernel. > > This is certainly possible. This means that there will be 5 more hooks > (such as the one in kernel/module.c, see PATCH 4 of 4). > > If the kernel maintainers are in favor of this approach, then there is not > much that stands against this. Yes, and it will force you to justify those hooks :) Good luck, greg k-h - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||
| Last update: 2005-05-21 08:20 [from the cache] ©2003-2008 | |||||||||||