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On Wed, May 04, 2005 at 04:21:23PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > Yes, I see your point. However the problem of malicious filesystem > "traps" applies to private namespaces as well (because of suid > programs). > > So if a user creates a private namespace, it should have the choice of: > > 1) Giving up all suid rights (i.e. all mounts are cloned and > propagated with nosuid) > > 2) Not giving up suid for cloned and propagated mounts, but having > extra limitations (suid/sgid programs cannot access unprivileged > "synthetic" mounts) Although I hate special cases I think that we might need 2) to avoid too much trouble tripping over the global namespace. OTOH that should also accelarate adoption of giving each user a separate namespace on login in the various distribution, which is a good thing ;-) - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||
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