[lkml]   [2005]   [Apr]   [19]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: Fortuna
    Theodore Ts'o  wrote:
    >For one, /dev/urandom and /dev/random don't use the same pool
    >(anymore). They used to, a long time ago, but certainly as of the
    >writing of the paper this was no longer true. This invalidates the
    >entire last paragraph of Section 5.3.

    Ok, you're right, this is a serious flaw, and one that I overlooked.
    Thanks for elaborating. (By the way, has anyone contacted to let them
    know about these two errors? Should I?)

    I see three remaining criticisms from their Section 5.3:
    1) Due to the way the documentation describes /dev/random, many
    programmers will choose /dev/random by default. This default
    seems inappropriate and unfortunate.
    2) There is a widespread perception that /dev/urandom's security is
    unproven and /dev/random's is proven. This perception is wrong.
    On a related topic, it is "not at all clear" that /dev/random provides
    information-theoretic security.
    3) Other designs place less stress on the entropy estimator, and
    thus are more tolerant to failures of entropy estimation. A failure
    in the entropy estimator seems more likely than a failure in the
    cryptographic algorithms.
    These three criticisms look right to me.

    Apart from the merits or demerits of Section 5.3, the rest of the paper
    seemed to have some interesting ideas for how to simplify and possibly
    improve the /dev/random generator, which might be worth considering at
    some point.
    To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
    the body of a message to
    More majordomo info at
    Please read the FAQ at

     \ /
      Last update: 2005-04-19 06:37    [W:0.020 / U:12.816 seconds]
    ©2003-2017 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site