Messages in this thread | | | From | (David Wagner) | Subject | Re: [PATCH] BSD Secure Levels: claim block dev in file struct rather than inode struct, 2.6.11-rc2-mm1 (3/8) | Date | Tue, 8 Feb 2005 14:33:07 +0000 (UTC) |
| |
>The attack is to hardlink some tempfile name to some file you want >over-written. This usually involves just a little bit of work, such as >recognizing that a given root cronjob uses an unsafe predictable filename >in /tmp (look at the Bugtraq or Full-Disclosure archives, there's plenty). >Then you set a little program that sleep()s till a few seconds before >the cronjob runs, does a getpid(), and then sprays hardlinks into the >next 15 or 20 things that mktemp() will generate...
Got it. Very good -- now I see. Thanks for the explanation. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
| |