Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 3 Feb 2005 22:53:05 +0100 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: dm-crypt crypt_status reports key? |
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Hi!
> > # dmsetup table /dev/mapper/volume1 > > 0 2000000 crypt aes-plain 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef 0 7:0 0 > > > Obviously, root can in principle recover this password from the > > running kernel but it seems silly to make it so easy. > > There seemed little point obfuscating it - someone will only > write a trivial utility that recovers it. > > The current approach has the advantage of making it > obvious to you that if you have root access, you have > access to the password while the encrypted data volumes > are mounted. > > Consider instead *why* you're worried about the password being > held in RAM and look for better solutions to *your* > perceived threats.
Actually, this *is* bad. I bet someone is going to post their secret key to lkml when debugging...
Or I can see conversation like this:
admin: "My devices work too slowly, is there something wrong with device mapper?"
Pavel walks to his console, says: "Okay, show me your /dev/mapper/volume1"
admin does that.
For this to be usefull Pavel'd have to remember the key before admin realizes what he has done, but..... Or imagine pavel shoulder-surfing admin trying to debug device mapper.
Pavel -- People were complaining that M$ turns users into beta-testers... ...jr ghea gurz vagb qrirybcref, naq gurl frrz gb yvxr vg gung jnl! - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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