Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: dm-crypt crypt_status reports key? | From | Fruhwirth Clemens <> | Date | Thu, 03 Feb 2005 16:17:16 +0100 |
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On Thu, 2005-02-03 at 05:15 -0500, Christopher Warner wrote: > On Thu, 2005-02-03 at 15:18 +0100, Fruhwirth Clemens wrote: > > > > Keys are handed to dm-crypt regularly the first time. But when dm-crypt > > hands keys back to user space, it uses some sort of blinding to make the > > keys meaningless for user space.
> I've been following this thread and i'm clearly at a loss as to how any > of this will prevent someone from writing a util to get the key?
This is not about trying to hide something which cannot be hidden.
See http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/2/2/256 . It's about a design that can cope with unintentional program/user errors. Think of it as a trigger safety.
-- Fruhwirth Clemens <clemens@endorphin.org> http://clemens.endorphin.org [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature] | |