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    SubjectRe: security / kbd
    On Sat, Dec 03, 2005 at 06:19:47PM +0100, Bodo Eggert wrote:

    > > But there are many ways of using such a file descriptor.
    > > This patch cripples the keymap changing but does not solve anything.
    >
    > Obviously it solves only a part. OTOH you can't keep an exploit open just
    > because there is another exploit.
    > Like I said, use chmod u+s loadkeys.

    Hmm. There is an obscure security problem. It was fixed in a bad way -
    people want to say unicode_start and unicode_stop and find that that
    fails today. Ach.

    You argue "you can't keep an exploit open" - but as far as I can see
    there is no problem that needs solving in kernel space.
    For example - today login does a single vhangup() for the login tty.
    In case that is a VC it could do a vhangup() for all VCs.
    That looks like a better solution.

    And "chmod u+s loadkeys" - you can't be serious..
    -
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