Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 7 Jan 2005 09:38:08 -0800 | From | Chris Wright <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] [request for inclusion] Realtime LSM |
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* Martin Mares (mj@ucw.cz) wrote: > Hello! > > > Yes, SETPCAP became a gaping security hole. Recall the sendmail hole. > > Hmmm, I don't remember now, could you give me some pointer, please?
Sure, the Wagner/Chen paper on setuid demystified has some references to it IIRC. http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~hchen/paper/usenix02.ps
> > This won't work, you can't increase the bset, which is hardcoded to > > leave out SETPCAP. Also, init is hard coded to start without SETPCAP. > > If I read the source correctly, init is allowed to increase the bset, > the other processes aren't.
Yes, you're right I forgot about that.
thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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