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SubjectRe: [PATCH] [request for inclusion] Realtime LSM
* Martin Mares (mj@ucw.cz) wrote:
> Hello!
>
> > Yes, SETPCAP became a gaping security hole. Recall the sendmail hole.
>
> Hmmm, I don't remember now, could you give me some pointer, please?

Sure, the Wagner/Chen paper on setuid demystified has some references to
it IIRC. http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~hchen/paper/usenix02.ps

> > This won't work, you can't increase the bset, which is hardcoded to
> > leave out SETPCAP. Also, init is hard coded to start without SETPCAP.
>
> If I read the source correctly, init is allowed to increase the bset,
> the other processes aren't.

Yes, you're right I forgot about that.

thanks,
-chris
--
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
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