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> > Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful. > Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post. > Please, no hard feelings. Speaking about implementation of the non executable pages semantics on IA32, PaX and Exec-Shield are very different (well not that much since 2.6 in fact because PAGEEXEC is now "segmentation when I can"). But when it comes to ASLR it's pretty much the same thing. The only difference may be the (very small) randomization of the brk() managed heap on ET_EXEC (which is probably the more "hackish" feature of PaX ASLR) but it seems that Arjan is even going to propose a patch for that (Is this in ES too ?). I think it's a great opportunity here to get the same basis for ASLR in PaX and ES merged into the vanilla kernel. If it's only a matter of changing the number of randomized bits in an additional PaX patch, it's no problem! It's more important to have a correct basis, focus on that. -- Julien TINNES - & france telecom - R&D Division/MAPS/NSS Research Engineer - Internet/Intranet Security GPG: C050 EF1A 2919 FD87 57C4 DEDD E778 A9F0 14B9 C7D6 - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||
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