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    SubjectRe: thoughts on kernel security issues
    Dave Jones <> wrote:
    > On Wed, Jan 12, 2005 at 06:28:38PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
    > > IMO, local DoS holes are important mainly because buggy userspace
    > > applications allow remote users to get in and exploit them, and for that
    > > reason we of course need to fix them up. Even though such an attacker
    > > could cripple the machine without exploiting such a hole.
    > >
    > > For the above reasons I see no need to delay publication of local DoS holes
    > > at all. The only thing for which we need to provide special processing is
    > > privilege escalation bugs.
    > >
    > > Or am I missing something?
    > The problem is it depends on who you are, and what you're doing with Linux
    > how much these things affect you.
    > A local DoS doesn't both me one squat personally, as I'm the only
    > user of computers I use each day. An admin of a shell server or
    > the like however would likely see this in a different light.
    > (though it can be argued a mallet to the kneecaps of the user
    > responsible is more effective than any software update)

    yup. But there are so many ways to cripple a Linux box once you have local
    access. Another means which happens to be bug-induced doesn't seem

    > An information leak from kernel space may be equally as mundane to some,
    > though terrifying to some admins. Would you want some process to be
    > leaking your root password, credit card #, etc to some other users process ?
    > priveledge escalation is clearly the number one threat. Whilst some
    > class 'remote root hole' higher risk than 'local root hole', far
    > too often, we've had instances where execution of shellcode by
    > overflowing some buffer in $crappyapp has led to a shell
    > turning a local root into a remote root.

    I'd place information leaks and privilege escalations into their own class,
    way above "yet another local DoS".

    A local privilege escalation hole should be viewed as seriously as a remote
    privilege escalation hole, given the bugginess of userspace servers, yes?

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