Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Wed, 12 Jan 2005 19:42:39 -0800 | | From | Andrew Morton <> | | Subject | Re: thoughts on kernel security issues |
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Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 12, 2005 at 06:28:38PM -0800, Andrew Morton wrote: > > > IMO, local DoS holes are important mainly because buggy userspace > > applications allow remote users to get in and exploit them, and for that > > reason we of course need to fix them up. Even though such an attacker > > could cripple the machine without exploiting such a hole. > > > > For the above reasons I see no need to delay publication of local DoS holes > > at all. The only thing for which we need to provide special processing is > > privilege escalation bugs. > > > > Or am I missing something? > > The problem is it depends on who you are, and what you're doing with Linux > how much these things affect you. > > A local DoS doesn't both me one squat personally, as I'm the only > user of computers I use each day. An admin of a shell server or > the like however would likely see this in a different light. > (though it can be argued a mallet to the kneecaps of the user > responsible is more effective than any software update)
yup. But there are so many ways to cripple a Linux box once you have local access. Another means which happens to be bug-induced doesn't seem important.
> An information leak from kernel space may be equally as mundane to some, > though terrifying to some admins. Would you want some process to be > leaking your root password, credit card #, etc to some other users process ? > > priveledge escalation is clearly the number one threat. Whilst some > class 'remote root hole' higher risk than 'local root hole', far > too often, we've had instances where execution of shellcode by > overflowing some buffer in $crappyapp has led to a shell > turning a local root into a remote root.
I'd place information leaks and privilege escalations into their own class, way above "yet another local DoS".
A local privilege escalation hole should be viewed as seriously as a remote privilege escalation hole, given the bugginess of userspace servers, yes?
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