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* Linus Torvalds (torvalds@osdl.org) wrote: > On Wed, 12 Jan 2005, Marcelo Tosatti wrote: > > How you feel about having short fixed time embargo's (lets say, 3 or 4 days) ? > > Please realize that I don't have any problem with a short-term embargo per > se, what I have problems with is the _politics_ that it causes. For > example, I do _not_ want this to become a > > "vendor-sec got the information five weeks ago, and decided to embargo > until day X, and then because they knew of the 4-day policy of the > kernel security list, they released it to the kernel security list on > day X-4" I agree, and in most of these cases long delay are due to things falling through cracks or not getting adequate cycles. Not so much politics. > See? That is playing politics with a security list. That's the part I > don't want to have anything to do with. If somebody did that to me, I'd > feel pissed off like hell, and I'd say "screw them". > > But in the absense of politics, I'd _happily_ have a self-imposed embargo > that is limited to some reasonable timeframe (and "reasonable" is > definitely counted in days, not weeks. And absolutely _not_ in months, > like apparently sometimes happens on vendor-sec). > > So if the embargo time starts ticking from _first_ report, I'd personally > be perfectly happy with a policy of, say "5 working days" (aka one week), > or until it was made public somewhere else. That's more or less my take. Timely response to reporter, timely debugging/bug fixing and timely disclosure. > IOW, if it was released on vendor-sec first, vendor-sec could _not_ then > try to time the technical list (unless they do so in a very timely manner > indeed). What about the reverse, and informing vendors? This is typical...project security contact gets report, figures out bug, works with vendor-sec on release date. In my experience, the long cycles rarely come from that final negotiation. It's usually not much of a negotiation, rather a "heads-up", "thanks". The two goals: 1) timely response, fix, dislosure; and 2) not leaving vendors with pants down; don't have to be mutually exclusive. thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||||
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