Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 9 Sep 2004 14:05:11 -0700 | From | Chris Wright <> | Subject | Re: [1/1][PATCH] nproc v2: netlink access to /proc information |
| |
* Roger Luethi (rl@hellgate.ch) wrote: > On Thu, 09 Sep 2004 16:01:06 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > > For the same reason, I'm not comfortable with implementing SELinux type > > > access controls myself. How about: > > > > > > config NPROC > > > depends on !SECURITY_SELINUX > > > > > > Adding access control later won't be a problem for anyone who groks > > > SELinux. > > > [...] > > Most obvious place to hook would be nproc_ps_get_task; we could then > > perform a check based on the sender's credentials and the target task's > > credentials, and simply return NULL if permission is not granted for > > that pair, thus skipping that task as if it didn't exist. That requires > > propagating the sender's credentials down to that function. > > > > Untested patch below. > > I used a somewhat different approach in my development tree (not > SELinuxy, though): Most fields were world readable, some required > credentials. > > I don't have any strong feelings on access control, so I'd be happy > with any mechanism that doesn't completely botch performance. Anyway, > I do not consider lack of access controls to be a showstopper.
Some of these things become quite sensitive, esp across setuid, etc. For prototyping, I agree, not a showstopper. For merging, it should be figured out properly.
thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
| |