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SubjectRe: [PATCH] Realtime LSM
On Sun, Sep 12, 2004 at 02:16:50PM -0500, Jack O'Quin wrote:

> I have not implemented that yet because (1) the current approach has
> proven adequate for the Linux audio user community, and (2) I haven't
> wanted to spend time mastering the internal kernel interfaces for
> accessing /proc from an LSM. I know it's not difficult, but I had
> other things I'd rather do. :-)

Here's a patch based on the one posted in
<1095117752.1360.5.camel@krustophenia.net> that adds a sysctl
(/proc/sys) interface. These sysctls don't seem to fit into any of the
existing groups, so I added CTL_SECURITY (/proc/sys/security).

Example:

# modprobe realtime
# echo 29 > /proc/sys/security/realtime/gid
Signed-Off-By: Lee Revell <rlrevell@joe-job.com>
Signed-off-by: Jody McIntyre <realtime-lsm@modernduck.com>


Index: linux/Documentation/realtime-lsm.txt
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ linux/Documentation/realtime-lsm.txt 2004-09-15 15:47:39.000000000 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+
+ Realtime Linux Security Module
+
+
+This Linux Security Module (LSM) enables realtime capabilities. It
+was written by Torben Hohn and Jack O'Quin, under the provisions of
+the GPL (see the COPYING file). We make no warranty concerning the
+safety, security or even stability of your system when using it. But,
+we will fix problems if you report them.
+
+Once the LSM has been installed and the kernel for which it was built
+is running, the root user can load it and pass parameters as follows:
+
+ # modprobe realtime any=1
+
+ Any program can request realtime privileges. This allows any local
+ user to crash the system by hogging the CPU in a tight loop or
+ locking down too much memory. But, it is simple to administer. :-)
+
+ # modprobe realtime gid=29
+
+ All users belonging to group 29 and programs that are setgid to that
+ group have realtime privileges. Use any group number you like.
+
+ # modprobe realtime mlock=0
+
+ Grants realtime scheduling privileges without the ability to lock
+ memory using mlock() or mlockall() system calls. This option can be
+ used in conjunction with any of the other options.
+
+ # modprobe realtime allcaps=1
+
+ Enables all capabilities, including CAP_SETPCAP. This is equivalent
+ to the 2.4 kernel capabilities patch. It is needed for root
+ programs to assign realtime capabilities to other processes. This
+ option can be used in conjunction with any of the other options.
+
+ The JACK Audio Connection Kit (jackit.sourceforge.net) includes a
+ `jackstart' program which uses CAP_SETPCAP to run the JACK daemon
+ and its clients with realtime capabilities.
+
+ There are serious security exposures with CAP_SETPCAP. If an
+ attacker manages to subvert some system daemon running with root
+ privileges, it can use this capability to deny needed privileges to
+ other root processes.
+
+Jack O'Quin, joq@joq.us
Index: linux/security/Makefile
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/Makefile 2004-09-15 15:47:11.000000000 -0400
+++ linux/security/Makefile 2004-09-15 15:47:39.000000000 -0400
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o d
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += commoncap.o capability.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += commoncap.o root_plug.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_REALTIME) += commoncap.o realtime.o
Index: linux/security/realtime.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ linux/security/realtime.c 2004-09-15 17:54:18.000000000 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * Realtime Capabilities Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Torben Hohn
+ * Copyright (C) 2003, 2004 Jack O'Quin
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+#define RT_LSM "Realtime LSM " /* syslog module name prefix */
+#define RT_ERR "Realtime: " /* syslog error message prefix */
+
+#include <linux/vermagic.h>
+MODULE_INFO(vermagic,VERMAGIC_STRING);
+
+/* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for allowed GID */
+static int maxuid = 65535;
+static int minuid = -1;
+
+/* module parameters */
+static int any = 0; /* if TRUE, any process is realtime */
+MODULE_PARM(any, "i");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(any, " grant realtime privileges to any process.");
+
+static int gid = -1; /* realtime group id, or NO_GROUP */
+MODULE_PARM(gid, "i");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(gid, " the group ID with access to realtime privileges.");
+
+static int mlock = 1; /* enable mlock() privileges */
+MODULE_PARM(mlock, "i");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(mlock, " enable memory locking privileges.");
+
+static int allcaps = 0; /* enable all capabilities */
+MODULE_PARM(allcaps, "i");
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(allcaps, " enable all capabilities, including CAP_SETPCAP.");
+
+static kernel_cap_t cap_bset_save; /* place to save cap-bound */
+
+int realtime_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /* Copied from security/commoncap.c: cap_bprm_set_security()... */
+ /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */
+ /* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
+ cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted);
+ cap_clear(bprm->cap_effective);
+
+ /* If a non-zero `any' parameter was specified, we grant
+ * realtime privileges to every process. If the `gid'
+ * parameter was specified and it matches the group id of the
+ * executable, of the current process or any supplementary
+ * groups, we grant realtime capabilites.
+ */
+
+ if (any || (gid != -1)) {
+
+ int rt_ok = 1;
+
+ /* check group permissions */
+ if ((gid != -1) &&
+ (gid != bprm->e_gid) &&
+ (gid != current->gid)) {
+ int i;
+ rt_ok = 0;
+
+ get_group_info(current->group_info);
+ for (i = 0; i < current->group_info->ngroups; ++i) {
+ if (gid == GROUP_AT(current->group_info, i)) {
+ rt_ok = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ put_group_info(current->group_info);
+ }
+
+ if (rt_ok) {
+ cap_raise(bprm->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_NICE);
+ cap_raise(bprm->cap_permitted, CAP_SYS_NICE);
+ if (mlock) {
+ cap_raise(bprm->cap_effective, CAP_IPC_LOCK);
+ cap_raise(bprm->cap_permitted, CAP_IPC_LOCK);
+ cap_raise(bprm->cap_effective,
+ CAP_SYS_RESOURCE);
+ cap_raise(bprm->cap_permitted,
+ CAP_SYS_RESOURCE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
+ * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
+ * capability sets for the file.
+ *
+ * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
+ * and permitted sets of the executable file.
+ */
+
+ if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
+ }
+ if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
+ cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
+ .ptrace = cap_ptrace,
+ .capget = cap_capget,
+ .capset_check = cap_capset_check,
+ .capset_set = cap_capset_set,
+ .capable = cap_capable,
+ .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send,
+ .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv,
+ .bprm_apply_creds = cap_bprm_apply_creds,
+ .bprm_set_security = realtime_bprm_set_security,
+ .bprm_secureexec = cap_bprm_secureexec,
+ .task_post_setuid = cap_task_post_setuid,
+ .task_reparent_to_init = cap_task_reparent_to_init,
+ .syslog = cap_syslog,
+ .vm_enough_memory = cap_vm_enough_memory,
+};
+
+#define MY_NAME __stringify(KBUILD_MODNAME)
+
+static ctl_table realtime_table[] =
+{
+ { .ctl_name = 1,
+ .procname = "any",
+ .data = &any,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+ },
+ { .ctl_name = 2,
+ .procname = "gid",
+ .data = &gid,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &minuid,
+ .extra2 = &maxuid
+ },
+ { .ctl_name = 3,
+ .procname = "mlock",
+ .data = &mlock,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+ },
+ { .ctl_name = 4,
+ .procname = "allcaps",
+ .data = &allcaps,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+static ctl_table realtime_root_table[] =
+{
+ { .ctl_name = SECURITY_REALTIME,
+ .procname = "realtime",
+ .mode = 0555,
+ .child = realtime_table },
+ { }
+};
+
+static ctl_table security_root_table[] =
+{
+ { .ctl_name = CTL_SECURITY,
+ .procname = "security",
+ .mode = 0555,
+ .child = realtime_root_table },
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_header;
+
+static void __exit exit_sysctl(void)
+{
+ unregister_sysctl_table(sysctl_header);
+}
+
+/* flag to keep track of how we were registered */
+static int secondary;
+
+static void __exit exit_security(void)
+{
+ cap_bset = cap_bset_save; /* restore cap-bound */
+
+ /* remove ourselves from the security framework */
+ if (secondary) {
+ if (mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &capability_ops))
+ printk(KERN_INFO RT_ERR "Failure unregistering "
+ "capabilities with primary module.\n");
+
+ } else if (unregister_security(&capability_ops)) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO RT_ERR
+ "Failure unregistering capabilities with the kernel\n");
+ }
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Realtime Capability LSM exiting\n");
+}
+
+static int __init capability_init(void)
+{
+ /* register ourselves with the security framework */
+ if (register_security(&capability_ops)) {
+
+ /* try registering with primary module */
+ if (mod_reg_security(MY_NAME, &capability_ops)) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO RT_ERR "Failure registering "
+ "capabilities with primary security module.\n");
+ printk(KERN_INFO RT_ERR "Is kernel configured "
+ "with CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES=m?\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ secondary = 1;
+ }
+
+ cap_bset_save = cap_bset; /* save cap-bound */
+
+ sysctl_header = register_sysctl_table(security_root_table, 0);
+ if (!sysctl_header) {
+ exit_security();
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (allcaps) {
+ cap_bset = to_cap_t(~0);
+ printk(KERN_INFO RT_LSM "enabling all capabilities\n");
+ }
+
+ if (any)
+ printk(KERN_INFO RT_LSM
+ "initialized (all groups, mlock=%d)\n", mlock);
+ else if (gid == -1)
+ printk(KERN_INFO RT_LSM
+ "initialized (no groups, mlock=%d)\n", mlock);
+ else
+ printk(KERN_INFO RT_LSM
+ "initialized (group %d, mlock=%d)\n", gid, mlock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit capability_exit(void)
+{
+ exit_sysctl();
+ exit_security();
+}
+
+security_initcall(capability_init);
+module_exit(capability_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Realtime Capabilities Security Module");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
Index: linux/include/linux/sysctl.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/linux/sysctl.h 2004-09-15 11:59:54.000000000 -0400
+++ linux/include/linux/sysctl.h 2004-09-15 16:56:21.000000000 -0400
@@ -61,7 +61,14 @@ enum
CTL_DEV=7, /* Devices */
CTL_BUS=8, /* Busses */
CTL_ABI=9, /* Binary emulation */
- CTL_CPU=10 /* CPU stuff (speed scaling, etc) */
+ CTL_CPU=10, /* CPU stuff (speed scaling, etc) */
+ CTL_SECURITY=11 /* Security modules */
+};
+
+/* CTL_SECURITY names: */
+enum
+{
+ SECURITY_REALTIME=1 /* Realtime LSM */
};

/* CTL_BUS names: */
Index: linux/security/Kconfig
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/Kconfig 2004-09-15 15:47:11.000000000 -0400
+++ linux/security/Kconfig 2004-09-15 15:47:39.000000000 -0400
@@ -44,6 +44,20 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG

If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.

+config SECURITY_REALTIME
+ tristate "Realtime Capabilities"
+ depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_CAPABILITIES!=y
+ default n
+ help
+ Answer M to build realtime support as a Linux Security
+ Module. Answering Y to build realtime capabilities into the
+ kernel makes no sense.
+
+ This module selectively grants realtime privileges
+ controlled by load-time parameters.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig

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