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On Thu, Aug 05 2004, Alan Cox wrote: > On Iau, 2004-08-05 at 20:35, Jens Axboe wrote: > > > exotic commands, and given the choice of having users able to send > > > arbitrary commands to the device and not access it at all, I would say > > > "not at all" would be good. > > > > Then don't make your cdrom device accesable. > > Lets get rid of root, I mean you don't need root, you could just turn > your computer off. > > What planet are you living on Jens ? I'm living on the planet where filtering is not possible, unless you want to have oodles of unmaintanable tables for different devices. And that means that if you don't trust a user with your cdrom currently, don't give him/her access to it. > End users have lots of reasons for being able to access /dev/cdrom > directly and also often for groups of users to access a disk directly > (for example Oracle databases). Yes I know. > That means any security model that isn't based around things beyond > basic device access is flawed. Then we should require raw io capability, as I've stated I'm fine with that. I'm not fine with filtering. > > Affects all devices that accept SG_IO. > > Then if you refuse to fix SG_IO perhaps all device drivers should remove > support for it ? Well they can't, it's a block layer property. The only thing the device sees is a regular struct request. -- Jens Axboe - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||||
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