![]() | |||||||||||
Messages in this thread |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Kyle Moffett wrote: | | Security issue: | Anybody with read access to certain block devices (Like CD-RW ~ ^^^^ | drives.) could reflash the firmware or otherwise turn the drive into a | rather expensive doorstop. | | Chosen solution for 2.6.8.1: | Only allow certain known-safe commands, anything else needs | root privileges, specifically CAP_SYS_RAWIO or CAP_SYS_ADMIN, ~ ^^^^^^^^ | (Seems sane, and follows with the general design of the rest of the | kernel). Can someone explain why it isn't anyone with _write_ access to the device? Surely it's better to drop a user into a group or setgid a program? If I have write access to a device then I can wipe it's media anyway. Is there something I'm missing? | Personally, I'd rather have a setuid executable on my system than | allow anybody in the cdwriters group to reflash my CDROM drive. OK, you keep the users out of the group and make the progaram setgid cdwriters. Then if someone makes a mess of the set[gu]id code you lose your cdwriter (which would be gone anyway) and not your whole system. Why force the program to escalate to root? David -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.5 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFBJvJ78LvjTle4P1gRAgFSAJ92lFbuqHqibMlotNi0jXln10SrhgCePBlS a4xebwkvjNxVV7L9eoLB7cI= =bswe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||
| Last update: 2005-03-22 14:05 [from the cache] ©2003-2008 | |||||||||||