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On Mon, 5 Jul 2004, FabF wrote: > > Surely, the super user (i.e. CAP_SYS_PTRACE in this context) should be > > allowed to read any process' memory without having to do the > > PTRACE_ATTACH/PTRACE_PEEKUSER kind of thing which strace(8) is doing?> > FYI may_ptrace_attach plugged somewhere between 2.4.21 & 22.This one get > used as is (ie without MAY_PTRACE) in proc_pid_environ but dunno about > reason why CAP_SYS_PTRACE isn't authoritative elsewhere. Ok, but still nobody seems to know why the super user is not allowed to access /proc/<PID>/mem of any task. Any code which nobody in the world knows the reason for, is broken and should be removed. I will wait a few weeks to see if someone does come up with the reason for that "extra secure" check in mem_read() and if nobody has objections I'll send Linus a patch to relax the check to a more reasonable one, namely to allow CAP_SYS_PTRACE process to bypass any other conditions imposed. Kind regards Tigran - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | ||||||||||||
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