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SubjectRe: In-kernel Authentication Tokens (PAGs)
* Kyle Moffett (mrmacman_g4@mac.com) wrote:
> On Jun 11, 2004, at 23:15, Chris Wright wrote:
> > Hrm. Wouldn't it be possible that two processes with same uid have
> > authenticated in different domains, and as such shouldn't be allowed to
> > touch each other's PAGs? Or is this not allowed?
>
> Linux doesn't really support the idea that a process should not be able
> to
> affect another process in the same UID. There's too many things that

Actually that's not the case. The UID is currently insufficient to
describe the security domain that a process is running in. The whole
of the LSM infrastructure is designed with this in mind. So somehting
like SELinux may enforce a security domain change (w/out a UID change)
across an execve() of pagsh. I was simply trying to ascertain if you
were storing this within task->user which I think would be wrong.

thanks,
-chris
--
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
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