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    SubjectRe: [RFD] Explicitly documenting patch submission
    On Sun, May 23, 2004 at 05:35:10PM +0200, Arjan van de Ven wrote:
    > On Sun, May 23, 2004 at 08:25:40AM -0700, Greg KH wrote:
    > > On Sun, May 23, 2004 at 10:02:17AM +0200, Arjan van de Ven wrote:
    > > > On Sun, 2004-05-23 at 08:46, Linus Torvalds wrote:
    > > > > Hola!
    > > > >
    > > > > This is a request for discussion..
    > > >
    > > > Can we make this somewhat less cumbersome even by say, allowing
    > > > developers to file a gpg key and sign a certificate saying "all patches
    > > > that I sign with that key are hereby under this regime". I know you hate
    > > > it but the FSF copyright assignment stuff at least has such "do it once
    > > > for forever" mechanism making the pain optionally only once.
    > >
    > > I don't think that adding a single line to ever patch description is
    > > really "pain". Especially compared to the FSF proceedure :)
    > >
    > > Also, gpg signed patches are a pain to handle on the maintainer's side
    > > of things, speaking from personal experience. However our patch
    > > handling scripts could probably just be modified to fix this issue, but
    > > no one's stepped up to do it.
    > I'll buy that
    > > And we'd have to start messing with the
    > > whole "web of trust" thing, which would keep us from being able to
    > > accept a patch from someone in a remote location with no way of being
    > > able to add their key to that web, causing _more_ work to be done to get
    > > a patch into the tree than Linus's proposal entails.
    > But I don't buy this. No web of trust is needed if all that is happening is
    > filing a form ONCE saying "all patch submissions signed with THIS key are
    > automatically certified". That doesn't prevent non-gpg users from using the
    > proposed mechanism nor involves web of trust metrics.

    a) without the web of trust, it's not much stronger than the original
    b) it's a second method so signing off is no longer a uniform process
    c) it requires tools and a database
    d) it adds significant amounts of cruft to patches
    e) said cruft is fragile and won't survive minor edits along the way

    That last point is key - we can't propagate a GPG signature upstream
    _with revisions_. Trivial revisions of the form 'rediff against latest
    kernel' are to be assumed.

    Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.
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