Messages in this thread |  | | | From | Jesse Pollard <> | | Subject | Re: UID/GID mapping system | | Date | Mon, 15 Mar 2004 11:05:36 -0600 |
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On Friday 12 March 2004 09:00, Søren Hansen wrote: > fre, 2004-03-12 kl. 14:52 skrev Jesse Pollard: > > > Let's just for a second assume that I'm the slow one here. Why is the > > > world a less secure place after this system is incorporated into the > > > kernel? > > > > Because a rogue client will have access to every uid on the server. > > As opposed to now when a rogue client is very well contained? > > > Mapping provides a shield to protect the server. > > A mapping system could provide extra security if implemented on the > server. That's true. This is, however, not what I'm trying to do. This > system is NOT a security related one (it doesn't increase nor decrease > security), but rather a convenience related one.
Then it becomes an identity mapping (as in 1:1) and is therefore not usefull.
If you are doing double mapping, then I (as a server administrator) would not export the filesystem to you.
The current situation is always a 1:1 mapping (NFS version < 4). Therefore any filesystem export is by definition within the same security domain.
If you as an administrator of a client host violate the UIDs assigned to you (by hiding the audit trail), then you are violating the rules established in that security domain; and should not be trusted - and the client host should not have an available export.
It is never necessary to map on a client. It means that the server has been improperly setup, or that the client is not within the proper security domain. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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