lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2004]   [Dec]   [30]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
SubjectRe: Stack guards, PaX and such
From
Date
On Thu, 2004-12-30 at 10:12 +0100, David Jacoby wrote:
> Hi everyone!
>
> I hope you had an nice and relaxing x-mas and are ready for a nice new
> years eve.
> I just have a little question, i really dont if this has ben discussed
> before, but if it
> has im really sorry.

are you talking about making the userspace stack not executable or the
kernel stacks?
With NX, userspace stacks already are not executable (and if you have a
cpu without NX you can use the execshield patches or PaX)

As for kernel stacks, well, with NX those are not executable either, and
to be honest, I can't remember the last time there was a user
exploitable kernel stack buffer overflow. So if your assertion is that
those are a common type of security problem, I disagree with you.
(One of the underlying causes is that the kernel stack is only really
small so it's relatively uncommon and deprecated to put arrays on the
kernel stack)


-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2005-03-22 14:09    [W:1.628 / U:0.084 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site