Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Fri, 15 Oct 2004 16:28:17 +0200 (CEST) | | From | Roman Zippel <> | | Subject | Re: Fw: signed kernel modules? |
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Hi,
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004, David Woodhouse wrote:
> > Can someone please put this patch into some context, where it's not > > completely pointless? As is it does not make anything more secure. > > Why is the kernel more trustable than a kernel module? > > Because it's not that hard to put the kernel onto read-only media or in > a flash chip to which you physically cut the Vpen line.
So put the modules there as well or put a ramdisk there that does module verifying and loading (and disable module loading after that). Again, why is this patch necessary? I have to repeat my main point from the last mail: If someone could show me how I can trust the running kernel, it should be rather easy to extend the same measures to modules without the need for this patch. Show me a way that this is not possible and I'll agree with you that this patch is needed.
bye, Roman - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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