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    SubjectRe: [RFC][PATCH] Make cryptoapi non-optional?
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    Jamie Lokier  wrote:
    >It may be that an attacker knows about a systemic problem with our
    >machine that we don't know about. For example the attacker might know
    >our pool state well enough shortly after boot time, to have a chance
    >at matching a dictionary of 2^32 hashes. The attacker might have had
    >a chance to read our disk, which reseeding the pool at boot time does
    >not protect against.
    >
    >With the right algorithm, we can protect against weaknesses of this kind.

    How? No matter what we do, the outputs are going to be a deterministic
    function of the state of the pool. If the attacker can guess the entire
    state of our pool (or narrow it down to 2^32 possibilities), we're screwed,
    no matter what. Right?

    I must be misunderstanding your point. What am I missing?
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