lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2003]   [Jul]   [11]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
SubjectRe: SECURITY - data leakage due to incorrect strncpy implementation
From
Date
On Gwe, 2003-07-11 at 23:44, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On 11 Jul 2003, Alan Cox wrote:
> >
> > Lots of kernel drivers rely on the libc definition of strncpy.
>
> But that's ok. We _do_ do the padding. I hated it when I wrote it, but as
> far as I know, the kernel strncpy() has done padding pretty much since day
> one.

/**
* strncpy - Copy a length-limited, %NUL-terminated string
* @dest: Where to copy the string to
* @src: Where to copy the string from
* @count: The maximum number of bytes to copy
*
* Note that unlike userspace strncpy, this does not %NUL-pad the buffer.
* However, the result is not %NUL-terminated if the source exceeds
* @count bytes.
*/

Only x86 does the padding

-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2005-03-22 13:46    [W:0.211 / U:0.132 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site