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SubjectRe: [Announcement] "Exec Shield", new Linux security feature

On Sun, 4 May 2003, Yoav Weiss wrote:

> I don't see how the case of mprotect(HIGH_ADDRESS, LEN, PROT_EXEC) be
> handled. Unlike mremap, mprotect doesn't offer a way to inform the user
> about a change of address.
>
> If I understand correctly, such case will cause a call to
> arch_add_exec_range(current->mm, vma) without any remapping, thus
> breaking the protection.

yes - the patch does not put any limit on which areas can be PROT_EXEC -
if the executable area is 'too wide' then there's no protection. The patch
tries to relocate areas which are freely relocatable, to make sure that in
the usual case the exec-limit will be quite low.

> One case where this would happen is some of the ancient loaders. IIRC,
> libc4's loader did just that. (right, nobody uses it anymore :)

yeah, we should not be worried about old loaders.

> For that reason, maybe X_workaround should be controlled per-executable
> by another ELF flag and not as a system-wide property.

i'll remove X_workaround from the next patch altogether - X can be fixed
by enabling an executable stack for the binary.

Ingo

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