Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 17 May 2003 14:30:44 +0200 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] in-core AFS multiplexor and PAG support |
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Hi!
> > The advantage of associating the PAG with the real uid rather than make it > > per-process is that it's a lot easier to administer that way, I think. You > > don't need to log out or anything like that to have changes take effect > > for your session, and it is very natural to say "this user now gets key > > X". Which is what I think you really want when you do something like enter > > a key to an encrypted filesystem, for example. > > The local user id is not a 'trusted' identity for a distributed filesystem. > Any user still have to prove his identity by obtaining tokens. > > If someone obtains my user id on in any way (i.e. weak password/ > bufferoverflow/ root exploit), he should not be allowed to use or access > my tokens as he hasn't proven his identity. In this case he would either
? If he has same uid as you *and* you have >=1 process running, what prevents him from gdb attach <that process>, and force it to do whatever he needs by forcing syscall? Pavel -- Pavel Written on sharp zaurus, because my Velo1 broke. If you have Velo you don't need...
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