Messages in this thread | | | From | (Miquel van Smoorenburg) | Subject | Re: [PATCH] new syscall: flink | Date | Mon, 7 Apr 2003 07:29:35 +0000 (UTC) |
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In article <b6qruf$elf$1@cesium.transmeta.com>, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote: >Followup to: ><Pine.BSO.4.44.0304062250250.9407-100000@kwalitee.nolab.conman.org> >By author: Mark Grosberg <mark@nolab.conman.org> >> As far as I understand it, isn't the protection information stored in the >> inode? The flink call is just linking an inode into a directory that the >> caller has write access to. The permissions and ownership of the file >> shouldn't change. > >The problem is when you get passed a file descriptor from another >process (via exec or file-descriptor passing) and you don't have >permissions to access the *directory*.
Can't you just check those permissions, i.e. behave like link() ? If you cant't access the path to the file, don't permit flink() ?
Mike. -- Linux isnt at war. War involves large numbers of people making losing decisions that harm each other in a vain attempt to lose last. Linux is about winning. -- Alan Cox, linux-kernel, <E1276kG-00019y-00@the-village.bc.nu>
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