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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] new syscall: flink
    Date
    Clayton Weaver wrote:
    >Once a process unlinks the last directory entry referencing a particular
    >inode that it has an
    >open fd for and then passes the open fd to some other process
    >(regardless of exactly how it does that), it seems to me that it has
    >conceded any interest in the previous security constraints associated
    >with that inode or with the recently
    >unlinked last directory entry for it.

    Huh? That's not the Unix model. If I pass you a read-only file
    descriptor, you're not supposed to be able to get write access to
    the fd. If you can, that's a security hole. This is true whether
    the fd refers to an inode still linked into the filesystem or not.

    >The cases with potential security implications are all in the context of
    >flink()ing to an open fd for an inode that still corresponds to at least
    >one directory entry.

    No, that's not correct.
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