Messages in this thread | | | From | (David Wagner) | Subject | Re: [PATCH] new syscall: flink | Date | 7 Apr 2003 17:37:36 GMT |
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Clayton Weaver wrote: >Once a process unlinks the last directory entry referencing a particular >inode that it has an >open fd for and then passes the open fd to some other process >(regardless of exactly how it does that), it seems to me that it has >conceded any interest in the previous security constraints associated >with that inode or with the recently >unlinked last directory entry for it.
Huh? That's not the Unix model. If I pass you a read-only file descriptor, you're not supposed to be able to get write access to the fd. If you can, that's a security hole. This is true whether the fd refers to an inode still linked into the filesystem or not.
>The cases with potential security implications are all in the context of >flink()ing to an open fd for an inode that still corresponds to at least >one directory entry.
No, that's not correct. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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