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SubjectRe: Flame Linus to a crisp!
From Valdis.Kletnieks@vt ...
DateThu, 24 Apr 2003 01:56:40 -0400
On Thu, 24 Apr 2003 06:39:50 BST, viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk said:

> Excuse me, but I don't get the last part.  You know that
> 	F had been built in environment of unspecified degree of security
> 	from source that had been kept in <--->
> 	written by programmers you don't know
> 	who had been hired in conformace with criteria <--->
> 	and released after passing QA of unknown quality (but you can bet
> that they had missed some security holes in the past)
> 	under a license that almost certainly disclaims any responsibility.
> 
> Care to explain how does one get from the trust in above to "trusted to run"?

On top of which, if a buffer overflow is found, the exploit will run in
the context of the signed program.  What it *does* mean is that once the
ankle-biting script kiddie breaks in, the kernel will hopefully refuse to
run their unsigned exploits.
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