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SubjectRe: 2.4+ptrace exploit fix breaks root's ability to strace

On 2003-03-22 17:28:54, Arjan van de Ven wrote:
>On Sat, Mar 22, 2003 at 05:13:12PM +0000, Russell King wrote:
>> int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
>> {
>> ...
>> + if (!is_dumpable(child))
>> + return -EPERM;
>> }
>> So, we went from being able to ptrace daemons as root, to being able to
>> attach daemons and then being unable to do anything with them, even if
>> you're root (or have the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability). I think this
>> behaviour is getting on for being described as "insane" 8) and is
>> clearly wrong.
>ok it seems this check is too strong. It *has* to check
>child->task_dumpable and return -EPERM, but child->mm->dumpable is not

So, do you mean that the following is enough:

int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
+ if (!child->task_dumpable)
+ return -EPERM;



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