Messages in this thread |  | | | Date | Mon, 24 Mar 2003 19:07:57 +0100 | | From | Pavel Machek <> | | Subject | security of fileutils (Re: Release of 2.4.21) |
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Hi!
> This specific ptrace hole is closed, yay. Now what about the other > 10,001 that still exist? People are blowing this ptrace bug WAY > out of proportion. The only reason why it demands a modicum of > vendor responsibility is that a-holes are making easy-to-use exploits > available for the script kiddies. > > In my more cynical moods, I wish bugtraq'ers would start posting > exploits to all the races in GNU coreutils (cp/mv/rm/...). Assuming > such actions would (finally) lead to bug fixes.... maybe then I will > start taking local root holes a bit more seriously. I will no more > than hint about this in public, but will respond privately with details > (if I know you).
Can you give me the details? I can imagine holes like "if I can force root to rm -rf /tmp/my-dir while my scripts are running, I can rm whatever I want" and probably could force root to cp files he did not want to copy, but that would require a *lot* of social ingeneering... Unlike ptrace which seems to be "gimme root, now!" case. Pavel (I left l-k in cc, you may want to strip it) -- Pavel Written on sharp zaurus, because my Velo1 broke. If you have Velo you don't need...
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