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    SubjectRe: kernel.org frontpage
    On Wed, Jan 29, 2003 at 01:55:22PM -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
    > Yes, an intruder could leave a forged signature with a random key
    > easily. But to leave a forged signature with the key that's already
    > on my keyring is a lot harder...

    I believe a script signs the files on ftp.kernel.org, which means the
    private key is on the master machine, probably without a pass phrase.
    That means that if the master server is compromised, its highly likely
    that a rogue file will have a correct signature.

    As hpa says, the GPG signature provides no assurance that Linus put
    up patch-2.5.60.bz2 and not some random other person.

    The only way to be completely sure is for Linus to gpg-sign the patches
    himself at source with a known gpg key using a secure pass phrase before
    they leave his machine (preferably before the machine is connected to
    the 'net to upload them for the really paranoid.)

    --
    Russell King (rmk@arm.linux.org.uk) The developer of ARM Linux
    http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html

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