lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2003]   [Jan]   [29]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: kernel.org frontpage
On Wed, Jan 29, 2003 at 01:55:22PM -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> Yes, an intruder could leave a forged signature with a random key
> easily. But to leave a forged signature with the key that's already
> on my keyring is a lot harder...

I believe a script signs the files on ftp.kernel.org, which means the
private key is on the master machine, probably without a pass phrase.
That means that if the master server is compromised, its highly likely
that a rogue file will have a correct signature.

As hpa says, the GPG signature provides no assurance that Linus put
up patch-2.5.60.bz2 and not some random other person.

The only way to be completely sure is for Linus to gpg-sign the patches
himself at source with a known gpg key using a secure pass phrase before
they leave his machine (preferably before the machine is connected to
the 'net to upload them for the really paranoid.)

--
Russell King (rmk@arm.linux.org.uk) The developer of ARM Linux
http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html

-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2005-03-22 13:32    [W:0.240 / U:0.120 seconds]
©2003-2011 Jasper Spaans. Advertise on this site