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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] (0/4) Entropy accounting fixes

    Hmm.. After more reading, it looks like (if I understood correctly), that
    since network activity isn't considered trusted -at-all-, your average
    router / firewall / xxx box will not _ever_ get any output from
    /dev/random what-so-ever. Quite regardless of the context switch issue,
    since that only triggers for trusted sources. So it was even more
    draconian than I expected.

    Are you seriously trying to say that a TSC running at a gigahertz cannot
    be considered to contain any random information just because you think you
    can time the network activity so well from the outside?

    Oliver, I really think this patch (which otherwise looks perfectly fine)
    is just unrealistic. There are _real_ reasons why a firewall box (ie one
    that probably comes with a flash memory disk, and runs a small web-server
    for configuration) would want to have strong random numbers (exactly for
    things like generating host keys when asked to by the sysadmin), yet you
    seem to say that such a user would have to use /dev/urandom.

    If I read the patch correctly, you give such a box _zero_ "trusted"
    sources of randomness, and thus zero bits of information in /dev/random.
    It obviously won't have a keyboard or anything like that.

    This is ludicrous.


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