Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 2 Nov 2002 23:28:52 -0500 (EST) | From | Alexander Viro <> | Subject | Re: Filesystem Capabilities in 2.6? |
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On Sat, 2 Nov 2002, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> But I like Al's idea of mount binds even more, although it requires maybe > a bit more administration.
OK, will do - will be fun to take a break from drivers/* and devfs excrements I'm digging in...
BTW, here's a fresh demonstration (found half an hour ago) that capabilities do *not* permit more lax attitude when writing stuff with elevated priveleges: * /usr/lib/games/nethack/recover is run at the boot time (as root) to recover crashed games. * Debian nethack 3.4.0-3.1 has it installed root.games and it is group-writable - cretinism in debian/rules, upstream is not guilty in that (BTW, so is /usr/lib/games/nethack/recover-helper). * ergo, any exploitable hole in sgid-games binary (rogue, for instance) is trivially elevated to root exploit.
Capabilities will *not* help that one - suid-games binaries need to be able to write as 'games', that's the whole reason why they are suid-games. Normally they use it to create save files. And quite a few of them are ripe with exploits - c.f. recent rogue(6) holes.
Normally that would lead only to ability to screw others' save files (and potentially to compromise their accounts, if corrupted save file can trigger a hole in another game). Besides, many of these beasts are old and didn't get too much attention.
Now, combined with packaging fuckup (which is a nice prototype of ACL fuckups to come) we get a lovely path leading to root exploit. Bugger all, one *still* has to think when writing code. A shame, isn't it?
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