Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 21 Aug 2001 19:49:12 +0100 | From | Alex Bligh - linux-kernel <> | Subject | Re: /dev/random in 2.4.6 |
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> No, let's not. If the attacker has a SHA-1 exploit, then all your > SSL and IPSEC and other implementations are insecure, and they are > probably the only reason you're using /dev/random anyway.
Fair point, though for some applications one could conceivably be using a different hash, and there are applications where breaking the hash gives you less than breaking the encryption.
> Instead, let's assume SHA-1 is good, since it probably is, and since > you have to assume this anyway for the rest of your system.
But if we assume SHA-1 is good, then you might as well drop all the entropy measurement and blocking logic, and /dev/urandom is fine for /ANY/ application. Furthermore, if SHA-1 is good, Robert's patch does no harm, but makes existing applications work.
IE if we assume SHA-1 is unbreakable, Robert's patch is harmless. If we assume SHA-1 /is/ breakable, Robert's patch is harmless if, and only if, in situations where it is configured on, it doesn't overestimate the entropy network events provide (sometimes this may be 0, in which case don't switch it on).
-- Alex Bligh - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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