Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 27 Jun 2001 14:56:23 +0200 (CEST) | From | Marco Colombo <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] User chroot |
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On 27 Jun 2001, David Wagner wrote:
> H. Peter Anvin wrote: > >By author: Jorgen Cederlof <jc@lysator.liu.se> > >> If we only allow user chroots for processes that have never been > >> chrooted before, and if the suid/sgid bits won't have any effect under > >> the new root, it should be perfectly safe to allow any user to chroot. > > > >Safe, perhaps, but also completely useless: there is no way the user > >can set up a functional environment inside the chroot. > > Why is it useless? It sounds useful to me, on first glance. If I want > to run a user-level network daemon I don't trust (for instance, fingerd), > isolating it in a chroot area sounds pretty nice: If there is a buffer > overrun in the daemon, you can get some protection [*] against the rest > of your system being trashed. Am I missing something obvious?
Just write a small program that chroots, drop privileges, and execs the untrusted daemon.
.TM. -- ____/ ____/ / / / / Marco Colombo ___/ ___ / / Technical Manager / / / ESI s.r.l. _____/ _____/ _/ Colombo@ESI.it
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