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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] User chroot
    On 27 Jun 2001, David Wagner wrote:

    > H. Peter Anvin wrote:
    > >By author: Jorgen Cederlof <>
    > >> If we only allow user chroots for processes that have never been
    > >> chrooted before, and if the suid/sgid bits won't have any effect under
    > >> the new root, it should be perfectly safe to allow any user to chroot.
    > >
    > >Safe, perhaps, but also completely useless: there is no way the user
    > >can set up a functional environment inside the chroot.
    > Why is it useless? It sounds useful to me, on first glance. If I want
    > to run a user-level network daemon I don't trust (for instance, fingerd),
    > isolating it in a chroot area sounds pretty nice: If there is a buffer
    > overrun in the daemon, you can get some protection [*] against the rest
    > of your system being trashed. Am I missing something obvious?

    Just write a small program that chroots, drop privileges, and
    execs the untrusted daemon.

    ____/ ____/ /
    / / / Marco Colombo
    ___/ ___ / / Technical Manager
    / / / ESI s.r.l.
    _____/ _____/ _/

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