Messages in this thread | | | From | (David Wagner) | Subject | Re: [PATCH] User chroot | Date | 27 Jun 2001 00:48:14 GMT |
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H. Peter Anvin wrote: >By author: Jorgen Cederlof <jc@lysator.liu.se> >> If we only allow user chroots for processes that have never been >> chrooted before, and if the suid/sgid bits won't have any effect under >> the new root, it should be perfectly safe to allow any user to chroot. > >Safe, perhaps, but also completely useless: there is no way the user >can set up a functional environment inside the chroot.
Why is it useless? It sounds useful to me, on first glance. If I want to run a user-level network daemon I don't trust (for instance, fingerd), isolating it in a chroot area sounds pretty nice: If there is a buffer overrun in the daemon, you can get some protection [*] against the rest of your system being trashed. Am I missing something obvious?
[*] Yes, I know chroot is not sufficient on its own to completely protect against this, but it is a useful part of the puzzle, and there are other things we can do to deal with the remaining holes. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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