Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 4 Jul 2000 16:12:23 -0700 (PDT) | From | <> | Subject | Re: Low Latency Patch |
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The problem is that non-executable stacks on x86 boxes can be gotten around in all cases where there already is an exploit. If you included Solar Designer's non-exec stack into the linux kernel and made it the default that'd just mean that non-exec stack exploits would become the norm. The result would be no net increase in security.
Stackguard is useful because it does block a class of exploits completely. If all you can do is overrun a single buffer and the only interesting thing you can do from there is modify the RA on the stack then StackGuard really will protect you. Of course if you can tweak a variable on the current stack frame and never touch the RA, then StackGuard buys you nothing. Libsafe is similarly useful.
On Mon, 3 Jul 2000, Robert Dinse wrote: > I don't disagree that the non-executable user stack area can be gotten > around, so can Stackguard, and I haven't looked at libsafe yet but I don't feel > comfortable counting on anything as a complete solution. The more layers the > better. > > > - > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ >
- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.rutgers.edu Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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