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Subject[Off-Topic] Goes along with the encryption thread earlier
just got this in today, talks about easing the export restrictions possibly being eased(we will 
know by December)


Original message from: info@cdt.org
>CDT POLICY POST Volume 5, Number 22 September 17, 1999
>
>A BRIEFING ON PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES ONLINE
>from THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY
>
>CONTENTS:
>(1) Administration Announces Export Revisions, Privacy Advocates Remain
>Skeptical
>(2) The Devil is in the Details: Export Control Proposal
>(3) The Proposed CESA Bill and Government Access to Keys
>(4) Activist Network Administration
>______________________________________________________________________
_
>
>(1) ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES EXPORT REVISIONS, PRIVACY ADVOCATES
REMAIN
>SKEPTICAL
>
>Just as the SAFE Act was about to come to the House floor, the Clinton
>Administration has announced plans to ease long-standing export controls on
>encryption products. The changes, if actually delivered as proposed, could
>make it much easier for people all over the world to gain access to the
>strongest encryption. At the same time, however, the White House announced
>its support for new legislation giving government officials access to
>sensitive decryption keys, when held by third parties, without full Fourth
>Amendment privacy protections.
>
>Documents detailing the new policy are available on CDT's web site at
>http://www.cdt.org/crypto/. Major features of the new policy include:
>
>* Export Relief -- The Administration plans to release revised regulations
>in December allowing export of "retail" encryption products of unlimited
>strength, subject to a one-time technical review, reporting requirements,
>and restrictions on sales to the seven terrorist nations.
>
>* Administration Support for New Law Enforcement Access Standards - The
>White House to support the Cyberspace Security Enhancement Act (CESA). While
>abandoning "secret search" provisions floated last month, the bill would
>establish standards for law enforcement access to decryption keys held by
>third parties.
>
>The devil is in the details when it comes to encryption regulations, and CDT
>will be watching carefully to see that the promised export relief is
>actually reflected in the new regulations without hedges or discretionary
>exceptions. Congressional backers of the SAFE Act, Wwhich would lift most
>encryption export controls, have vowed to keep the pressure up. Meanwhile,
>though, they are expected to postpone a vote on SAFE pending satisfactory
>regulations from the Administration.
>
>CDT remains concerned that the access provisions in the new CESA bill fall
>short of the kind of protections needed in the evolving networked
>environment.
>
>For up-to-date information and further background about the encryption
>debate please visit CDT's web site at http://www.cdt.org/crypto/.
>
>______________________________________________________________________
__
>
>(2) THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS: EXPORT CONTROLS
>
>The Administration policy, if implemented as promised, would represent a
>major change in U.S. export policy. As described by White House officials,
>widely-available encryption products like 128-bit web browsers or PGP
>software would be exportable to all but a few countries after a technical
>review and subject to reporting requirements about who the product was
>shipped to.
>
>Officials say that under regulations due to be released before the end of
>the year:
>
>* "Retail" encryption hardware and software of unlimited strength could be
>exported without a license after a "one-time technical review" and subject
>to post-export reporting of transfers. Reporting is to be limited to the
>information that "companies normally collect" (i.e., who the product was
>transferred to, not who the end user was.)
>
>* Non-retail "custom" products would face further restrictions on sales to
>foreign governments and identified terrorist or criminal organizations.
>
>* Export of encryption products with bit lengths up to 64 bits would be
>entirely decontrolled.
>
>As described, the regulations would represent an abandonment of the U.S.
>policy that had been based on bit-length limits and the promotion of key
>recovery.
>
>A remaining concern is whether the regulations will in fact give the broad
>relief promised. On more than one occasion in the years since the failed
>1993 Clipper Chip proposal, hopes for substantial progress on encryption
>policy have failed to provide comprehensive reform. (For some examples, see
>CDT's "History of Administration Encryption Policy" on the Web at
>http://www.cdt.org/crypto/admin/initiatives.shtml)
>
>In addition, the announcement leaves many export controls problems
>unresolved. For example, cryptographic researchers and small encryption
>distributors would apparently remain unable to easily distribute encryption
>without satisfying the federal regulatory process. Challenges to these
>restrictions - such as the Bernstein, Karn, and Junger cases - will remain
>important in asserting the First Amendment rights of encryption publishers.
>
>______________________________________________________________________
__
>
>(3) THE PROPOSED CESA BILL AND GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO KEYS
>
>CDT remains concerned that the provisions of the new CESA legislation will
>not adequately protect the privacy of sensitive decryption keys in the new
>online environment.
>
>Major provisions of CESA include:
>
>* Prohibits the disclosure of decryption information, when held by third
>parties, without appropriate legal authority as spelled out in the bill.
>
>* Requires disclosure of keys to government agents with a court order, when
>needed to decrypt information where there is no "constitutional expectation
>of privacy" in the underlying plaintext. Many privacy protections stem from
>laws passed by Congress and not from the Constitution directly. Under this
>provision, keys could be readily accessible for sensitive encrypted
>information stored with third parties such as financial records, medical
>records, or in fact any encrypted data stored on a network server or with an
>ISP.
>
>* Authorizes million for the FBI's Tech Center, designed to promote law
>enforcement tools and techniques for defeating encryption.
>
>* Prohibits disclosure in open court of the techniques used to obtain the
>plaintext of encrypted information. A delicate legal balance has been struck
>over time between the rights of defendants and the need to protect law
>enforcement agents and methods. This new provision could undermine that
>balance and the ability of citizens to receive a fair trial.
>
>CESA no longer includes "secret search" authority allowing government agents
>to secretly break into people's homes and install "recovery devices" on
>their computer if they did not use key recovery. The bill also no longer
>contains other provisions to promote the use of key recovery.
>
>CDT remains concerned that CESA's provisions do not require the more
>stringent showing of "probable cause" and notice of a seizure that the
>Fourth Amendment would demand of keys taken from a person's own computer or
>data seized from one's own house. In the Information Age, more and more of
>our most personal data is moving out of the desk drawer and off of the
>desktop computer and out onto the Internet. CESA has opened a new and
>complex debate about the standards that are needed to protect sensitive data
>in networked electronic storage.
>
>______________________________________________________________________
_
>
>(4) ACTIVIST NETWORK ADMINISTRATION
>
>To join the CDT Activist Network, visit http://www.cdt.org/join/ and enter
>your email address and zip code.
>
>To leave the CDT Activist Network, enter your email address at:
>http://www.cdt.org/action/unsubscribe.shtml .
>
>E-mail questions or comments to info@cdt.org.
>
>Detailed information about online civil liberties issues may be found at
>http://www.cdt.org/
>
>This document may be redistributed freely in full or linked to
>http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_5.22.shtml.
>Excerpts may be re-posted with prior permission of info@cdt.org
>
>Policy Post 5.22 Copyright 1999 Center for Democracy and Technology
>


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