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SubjectRe: Modular Kernel Security
On Wed, Aug 04, 1999 at 06:48:40PM -0000, Secret Squirrel wrote:

> Since the cracker/hacker community is actively drooling over this route
> to undermining security, isn't the time ripe to add some superior facilities
> to control kernel-module loading and authenticate modules ?

What's wrong with using securelevel (2.0) or capabilities (2.2)? AIUI,
inserting and removing modules requires securelevel <= 0 (2.0) or the
CAP_SYS_MODULE capability. I'm not familiar with using securelevel or
capabilities, but I presume the former prevents you from reducing securelevel
except in single user mode (looking at the code, it seems only init can
reduce securelevel, which makes sense); presumably with the latter init
just drops CAP_SYS_MODULE from the inheritable set, along with whatever
capabilities allow you to set capabilities to executables.

If that's wrong, I'm sure someone will correct me.

--
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Notice in Sainsbury's Supermarket, London - Daily Mail

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