Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 3 Apr 1999 13:10:20 +1000 | From | Richard Gooch <> | Subject | Re: Subject: Re: ext3 to include capabilities? |
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Santos Halpar writes: > Albert D. Cahalan" <acahalan@cs.uml.edu> wrote: > > G. Sumner Hayes writes: > > > Albert Cahalan <acahalan@cs.uml.edu> wrote: > > > > >> 1. Put capabilities information in the executable header. > > >> 2. Mark the executable setuid root. > > >> 3. Have the kernel check for #1 if #2, and prefer #1 if present. > > > > > > Of course, you've completely busted up security. > > > > Nope, think about the system a bit more. It isn't so stupid. > > > > if(setuid){ > > if(root_owned && cap_header) use_cap_header(); > > else use_setuid_bit(); > > } > > > > I understand that. Read my concern again. I don't understand how > your system can possibly make my (already installed) 2.0.x kernel > ignore the setuid bit. I have 2.0.x around for stability, so putting > random patches into it isn't really an option. It seems like your > system will run programs with capabilities on 2.2.x but full-blown > setuid on 2.2.x, which opens up the security holes I'm concerned ^^^^^
2.0.x I assume.
> about when running the most stable (for the moment :) and secure > kernel. :(
Either: patch 2.0.x to ignore suid-root or mount filesystems with the nosuid option if you really don't want to trust suid-root binaries.
That of course can leave you with a crippled system (unless you only log in as root), but then again so does putting capabilities in ext2fs, since all your binaries which require capabilites will now no longer run. I suppose a compromise would be to have / mounted with suid allowed but all other filesystems nosuid.
Regards,
Richard....
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